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laws to accept a succession under the benefit of inventory,18 and
this'acceptance is merely an expression of her consent to receive
the residue of the community, if any, after the debts of the com-
munity are paid.19
The above indicates that the right of the wife to the share
of the community is residuary in character, and administration is
a step which necessarily must be taken in order to find out what
that residue is. The costs thereof are for a service rendered to
the community as a whole, and are necessary to accomplish a
purpose without which the portions of the different parties could
not be identified. Consequently it is obvious that these costs
should be sustained by the entity.
A.C.
TESTAMENTARY CAPAcITY-THE EFFECT OF INTERDICTION-The
sister of John Lanata, deceased; instituted suit to annul the will
of her brother for want of testamentary capacity. John Lanata
had been interdicted in 1904 under Article 422 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 and the judgment continued in full force and
effect until his death in 1942. Plaintiff rests her case entirely on
the judgment of interdiction. Defendant testamentary executor
filed an exception of no cause of action and urged that the mere
judgment of interdiction did not deprive testator of testamentary
capacity. Held, exception of no cause of action sustained. "With
the conclusion reached then that R. C. C. Articles 402 and 403 are
not applicable to testaments, it would seem to follow, and we
hold, that testaments are likewise excluded from the preceding
codal provision, Article 401, which is the one that declares null
all acts done by the persons interdicted."' An interdicted person
can make a valid will, and the absence of an allegation that the
testator was of unsound mind at the time of making the will is
fatal to the validity of the petition. Succession of, Lancta, 18 So.
(2d) 500 (La. 1944).
This case presents for determination a question that is res
nova in Louisiana jurisprudence-Does interdiction alone destroy
the interdict's capacity to make a valid will?
In order to determine who may dispose of property by dona-
tion mortis causa the articles of the Civil Code specifically dealing
18. La. Act 4 of 1882, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2213).
19. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
1. Succession of Lanata, 18 So.(2d) 500, 505 (La. 1944).
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with this subject should be reviewed first. Article 14702 provides
that only those persons whom the law expressly declares inca-
pable are prohibited from making donations mortis causa. An
examination of the articles following under the same title and
chapter of the Code fails to disclose any declaration that inter-
*diction incapacitates a person from making donations mortis
causa.
'It may be argued that Article 4013 would incapacitate an in-
terdict because of its provision that "all acts done by the person
interdicted from the date of filing the petition for interdiction,
until the day when the same is pronounced, are null." The view
has been expressed that since this article does not declare that
acts done after judgment of interdiction are null, it cannot be
presumed that such a conclusion was intended by the redactors
of the Code.4 However, it appears more plausible to assume that
if acts done after the date of filing but prior to judgment are null,
those done after the judgment of interdiction has been rendered
are likewise null. It would seem that the judgment itself makes
a much stronger case for declaring acts done subsequent to it as
null.5
In the principal case the major portion of the opinion was de-
voted to a discussion of Articles 401, 402, and 403, and through
clear and sound reasoning the conclusion was reached that these
articles apply only to contracts and not to wills. A similar dis-
cussion pertaining to the applicability of these articles to wills
appears elsewhere.6 Letting these discussions suffice, Article 1475,
relating to the capacity of a person to make a will, simply states
that the person making the donation must be of sound mind.
Article 1472, as interpreted by numerous decisions,7 lays down
the rule that the capacity of giving need exist only at the moment
the donation is made. With these articles in mind, there is nothing
to prevent a person interdicted for an infirmity, other than that
of the mind, from making a valid will. This could not be so readily
concluded in the case where a person has been interdicted under
Article 389 for mental incapacity. In such a situation, the judg-
ment of interdiction is conclusive evidence of mental unsound-
2. Art. 1470, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 401, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Comment (1944) 18 Tulane L. Rev. 620.
5. Stockmeyer v. Tobin, 139 U.S. 176, 11 S.Ct. 504, 35 LEd. 123 (1891).
6. Comment (1944) 18 Tulane L. Rev. 620.
7. Succession of Bey, 46 La. Ann. 773, 15 So. 297 (1894); Succession of
Brugier, 146 La. 29, 83 So. 366 (1919); Succession of Heineman, 172 La. 1057,
136 So. 51 (1931); Succession of Knight, 151 So. 230 (La. App. 1933).
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ness," and for this reason there does seem to be a necessity for
determining under which article and for what cause the interdic-
tion was obtained. This view is in accord with that of Chief
Justice O'Niell's dissent in the instant case where he states that,
when the court is dealing with a will made by a person inter-
dicted under Article 422 there is no need to determine what the
rule would be if a person under interdiction for insanity (Article
389) had made a will. In the Lanata case the interdiction obtained
under Article 422 certainly does not prove anything regarding
the testator's state of mind. It is not at all clear why the deceased
had been interdicted, the only certain fact being that he was not
interdicted for mental incapacity. Therefore, the facts present no
reason why any inquiry should be made as to the mental condition
of testator at the time the will was-executed. Although the court
held that interdiction under either Article 389 or Article 422
would not in itself invalidate a will, it seems that the door is still
open with regard to the validity of a will executed after judg-
ment of interdiction under Article 389 has been rendered.
B. A. G.
TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF
FICTITIous NAME STATUTE-The plaintiff organized a group of
independent cab operators Under the name of "Checker Cabs"
and had them paint their cabs in the same fashion. The defend-
ant, two years later, incorporated under the name of "New Or-
leans Checker Cabs, Incorporated," and this suit was brought to
enjoin him from conducting a taxicab business under that name.'
The defendant contended (1) that the defendant was prior regis-
trant under the General Corporation Laws of Louisiana,2 and (2)
that the plaintiff failed to comply with a Louisiana statute which
prohibits the carrying on of any business under an assumed name
8. Art. 1788, La. Civil Code of 1870; Iolland v. Miller, 12 La. Ann. 624
(1857): "It is not the judgment of interdiction therefore, that creates the
incapacity, it is evidence only of its existence, but it is conclusive evidence."
1. The parties litigant are reversed herein for convenience of discussion.
In fact, New Orleans Checker Cabs, Inc., the later user of the name, was
plaintiff, and suit was for an injunction against the prior user, Mumphrey.
Mumphrey set up a reconventional demand. Judgment was adverse to plain-
tiff and was in favor of defendant on his reconventional demand. The pres-
ent discussion Is concerned with this latter aspect of the case; and for this
reason Mumphrey is regarded throughout as plaintiff.
2. La. Act 250 of 1928, as amended by La. Act 65 of 1932 and La. Act 34
of 1935 (4 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080-11541.
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